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Abstract
Background: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis suggests that normal subjects are "foreseeable" and ventromedial
prefrontal patients are "myopic" in making decisions, as the behavior shown in the Iowa Gambling Task. The
present study questions previous findings because of the existing confounding between long-term outcome
(expected value, EV) and gain-loss frequency variables in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). A newly and
symmetrically designed gamble, namely the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT), with a high-contrast EV between bad
(A, B) and good (C, D) decks, is conducted to clarify the issue about IGT confounding. Based on the prediction
of EV (a basic assumption of IGT), participants should prefer to choose good decks C and D rather than bad decks
A and B in SGT. In contrast, according to the prediction of gain-loss frequency, subjects should prefer the decks
A and B because they possessed relatively the high-frequency gain.
Methods: The present experiment was performed by 48 participants (24 males and 24 females). Most subjects
are college students recruited from different schools. Each subject played the computer version SGT first and
completed a questionnaire for identifying their final preference. The IGT experimental procedure was mostly
followed to assure a similar condition of decision uncertainty.
Results: The SGT experiment demonstrated that the prediction of gain-loss frequency is confirmed. Most
subjects preferred to choose the bad decks A and B than good decks C and D. The learning curve and
questionnaire data indicate that subjects can not "hunch" the EV throughout the game. Further analysis of the
effect of previous choice demonstrated that immediate gain increases the probability to stay at the same deck.
Conclusion: SGT provides a balanced structure to clarify the confounding inside IGT and demonstrates that
gain-loss frequency rather than EV guides decision makers in these high-ambiguity gambles. Additionally, the
choice behavior is mostly following the "gain-stay, lose-randomize" strategy to cope with the uncertain situation.
As demonstrated in SGT, immediate gain can bring about a long-term loss under uncertainty. This empirical result
may explain some shortsighted behaviors in real life.
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Background
Studies in behavioral decision-making and affective neu-
roscience have found that typical decision makers are fre-
quently "myopic" [1-5] to long-term outcome (expected
value, EV) [6]. Conversely, Damasio [7] and Bechara et al.
[8,9] proposed the Somatic Marker Hypothesis and con-
ducted the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to test whether ven-
tromedial prefrontal patients are shortsighted in terms of
the future and long-term outcome, and whether typical
decision makers can predict or foresee the future. For
comparison, the notion of shortsighted vs. foresighted is
adopted in this study. A marked difference exists between
shortsightedness and foresight. The IGT was the central
test for a verification of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis.
Some studies have attempted to replicate or modify the
protocol used in the IGT [10-12]; whereas others have
proposed that the hypothesis was theoretically inade-
quate [1,5,13-16]. Lin et al. [17] pointed out that there are
increasing number of studies [18-28] to demonstrate a
contradictory phenomenon, namely, the "prominent
deck B phenomenon" [29]. The phenomenon showed
that normal decision makers can not prevent their prefer-
ence to "bad" (EV) deck B in the standard version of IGT
(or, due to the effect of "gain-loss frequency"). Recently,
Bechara (Sevy et al.) [30,31] also revealed a "prominent
deck B phenomenon". In their study, normal subjects pre-
ferred the bad deck B rather than the other three decks.
Furthermore, the chosen number of deck B (31) in Sevy et
al. study [30] is almost a double of Bechara et al. data in
1994 (about 17) [8]. On the other hand, Lin et al. [29]
analyzed the existing experimental results adopting sim-
ple version of IGT and suggest that the "prominent deck B
phenomenon" may be due to a confounding from gain-
loss frequency. Additionally, Chiu and Lin [32] utilize a
modified version of IGT to demonstrate that subjects'
preference to deck C is also due to gain-loss frequency, not
EV. A fundamental structural flaw exists in a failure of
orthogonal separation between EV and gain-loss fre-
quency (or, frequency of punishments and rewards). This
limitation has not been properly evaluated in IGT litera-
ture. The study tries to explore the implications of this
flaw.
Damasio's [7] Somatic Marker Hypothesis proposes that
normal decision-making is often assisted by somatic
markers. Ventromedial prefrontal patients are influenced
largely by immediate reinforcement and are insensitive to,
or cannot see, future consequences due to a lack of past
affective experiences. Normal subjects with intact somatic
markers benefit from repeated exposure to punishments
and rewards when performing tasks and are cognizant of
future outcome. Somatic states serve as a neural expres-
sion biasing the brain process when evaluating the bad-
ness or goodness of each decision. According to Damasio
[7]:
"... the brains of the normal subjects were gradually learning to
predict a bad outcome, and were signaling the relative badness
of the particular deck before the actual card-turning."
(Damasio, 1994, p 220).
In short, the Somatic Marker Hypothesis suggests that
somatic markers, which are processed implicitly, can facil-
itate decision makers in making advantageous decisions
[9] and guiding explicit decision making [33,34].
The most compelling empirical evidence for supporting
the Somatic Marker Hypothesis is found in the IGT [8].
Over the past decade, the IGT has been widely employed
as a neuropsychological research instrument for investi-
gating affective and executive function. At least 100 scien-
tific studies have utilized the IGT to investigate a diverse
set of neurological and psychiatric populations [35].
In the IGT, card decks A and B were designated "bad"
decks with low EV ($ -250), and C and D were "good"
decks with high EV ($ +250) in average 10 trials. Subjects
and ventromedial prefrontal patients selected "bad" decks
during the first 30 card-turning trials (out of 100) [7,36];
however, normal subjects gradually shifted to "good"
decks and avoided the "bad" decks [8,9,36-39]. However,
a careful examination of the IGT reveals a critical con-
founding between EV and gain-loss frequency. On aver-
age, for each 10-card unit, deck A contains 5 gains and 5
losses, and deck B contains 9 gains and 1 loss. On the
other hand, deck C contains 6.25 gains, 2.5 standoffs and
1.25 losses, and D contains 9 gains and 1 loss. Altogether
the bad decks (A and B) contain 14 gains and 6 losses,
whereas good decks (C and D) contain 15.25 gains, 2.5
standoffs, and only 2.25 losses. Both good and bad decks
have a similar number of gains, whereas the good decks
have significantly fewer losses (see Tables 1 and 2). There-
fore, it is not clear whether subjects' choices of good decks
in the IGT were driven by improved EV or gain-loss fre-
quency. This study attempts to generate a symmetrical and
fair experiment to demonstrate the relative guiding power
of gain-loss frequency and EV under uncertainty, specifi-
cally to identify which factor most comprehensively dom-
inates normal subject preferences. To differentiate
between the relative contributions of EV and gain-loss fre-
quency, this study applies a new task, namely, the Soo-
chow Gambling Task (SGT) [40,41] (see Table 1).
Method
A two-phase study was designed to explore learning proc-
ess and final preferences during decision making. Four
card decks, randomized into 24 arrangements (e.g.,
ABCD, BCDA, CDAB, etc.), were presented on a computer
screen. Forty-eight college students and adults (24 males,
24 females; age: 18–30 years, mean age: 20.71 years) par-
ticipated in this study. Each subject undertook one set ofBehavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:13 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/13
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card arrangement to balance the position effect. After
completing the computer game, subjects answered a ques-
tionnaire that gauged their memories of task characteris-
tics and their deck preferences.
The SGT contains four decks, each containing 5 card-turn-
ing trials as a unit, for a total of 100 trials. The "bad" decks
(defined by EV, as in IGT) in the SGT have worse EV ($ -
250) and better gain-loss frequency (4 gains and 1 loss),
Table 1: The immediate net value of each trial and gain-loss structure in the original IGT and SGT
IGT Serial Numbers ABC D SGT ABC D
1 100 100 50 50 1 200 100 -200 -100
2 100 100 50 50 2 200 100 -200 -100
3 -50 100 0 50 3 200 100 -200 -100
4 100 100 50 50 4 200 100 -200 -100
5 -200 100 0 50 5 -1050 -650 1050 650
6 100 100 50 50 6 200 100 -200 -100
7 -100 100 0 50 7 200 100 -200 -100
8 100 100 50 50 8 200 100 -200 -100
9 -150 -1150 05 0 9 200 100 -200 -100
10 -250 100 0 -200 10 -1050 -650 1050 650
11 100 100 50 50 11 200 100 -200 -100
12 -250 100 25 50 12 200 100 -200 -100
13 100 100 -25 50 13 200 100 -200 -100
14 -150 -1150 50 50 14 200 100 -200 -100
15 -100 100 50 50 15 -1050 -650 1050 650
16 100 100 50 50 16 200 100 -200 -100
17 -200 100 25 50 17 200 100 -200 -100
18 -50 100 -25 50 18 200 100 -200 -100
19 100 100 50 50 19 200 100 -200 -100
20 100 100 0 -200 20 -1050 -650 1050 650
21 100 -1150 50 50 21 200 100 -200 -100
22 -200 100 50 50 22 200 100 -200 -100
23 100 100 50 50 23 200 100 -200 -100
24 -250 100 0 50 24 200 100 -200 -100
25 100 100 25 50 25 -1050 -650 1050 650
26 -100 100 0 50 26 200 100 -200 -100
27 -150 100 50 50 27 200 100 -200 -100
28 -50 100 50 50 28 200 100 -200 -100
29 100 100 -25 -200 29 200 100 -200 -100
30 100 100 0 50 30 -1050 -650 1050 650
31 -250 100 50 50 31 200 100 -200 -100
32 -100 -1150 50 50 32 200 100 -200 -100
33 -150 100 50 50 33 200 100 -200 -100
34 100 100 25 50 34 200 100 -200 -100
35 100 100 25 -200 35 -1050 -650 1050 650
36 100 100 50 50 36 200 100 -200 -100
37 -50 100 -25 50 37 200 100 -200 -100
38 -200 100 50 50 38 200 100 -200 -100
39 100 100 0 50 39 200 100 -200 -100
40 100 100 -25 50 40 -1050 -650 1050 650
Final Outcomes -1000 ($) -1000 ($) +1000 ($) +1000 ($) Final Outcomes -2000 ($) -2000 ($) +2000 ($) +2000 ($)
Note. In these gambling tasks, the internal gamble structure of IGT and SGT and the trial to end the game is unknown to the subjects. The subjects 
are asked to minimize monetary expenditure and maximize their winnings by choosing one card from the four decks in each trial. In the table, 
negative values are marked with a bold font size. (Left part: IGT) Deck A contains the relative high-frequency loss, while decks B, C, and D contain 
the high-frequency gain (net value within each trial). Decks A and B have negative net value (namely, the EV), -250($) over an average of ten trials; 
moreover, C and D have a positive net value of +250($) over an average of ten trials. (Right part: SGT) Five cumulative trials are repeated for each 
deck in the Soochow Gambling Task, decks A and B have high-frequency gain, while decks C and D exhibit a reversed gain-loss pattern. The task 
enlarges the difference between positive and negative EVs to make the difference more noticeable than in the Iowa Gambling Task. While playing 
this game, subjects only experienced a gain or a loss during each trial, and there was no reciprocal gain-loss within individual trials.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:13 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/13
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whereas the "good" decks have better EV ($ +250) and
worse gain-loss frequency (1 gain and 4 losses). Thus, in
the SGT, the operation of gain-loss frequency and EV var-
iables will predict different choice patterns. If decision-
making is guided by EV, subjects will prefer the good
decks (C and D) over the bad decks (A and B). Conversely,
when participant choice behavior is controlled by imme-
diate gain-loss, the perceived gain will keep subjects on
the same deck. The deck with the highest number of gains
will increase the probability of being chosen. Table 2 sum-
marizes a comparison of the task structures and predic-
tions between the IGT and the SGT.
The SGT adopted an experimental procedure similar to
that used in the IGT to assure that subjects perform the
task under uncertain conditions. The probability struc-
tures of gain-loss frequency were unknown to subjects in
both tasks (IGT and SGT). Subjects were also ignorant of
the time limitation in the experiment. Both tasks then are
uncertain in the traditional sense.
This study adopted the subject instructions employed by
Bechara et al. [36]. The key points of the instructions are
as follows:
"The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible and,
if you find yourself unable to win, make sure you avoid losing
money as much as possible. I won't tell you for how long the
game will continue. You must keep on playing until the compu-
ter stops. It is important to know that the colors of the cards are
irrelevant in this game. The computer does not make you lose
money at random. However, there is no way for you to figure
out when the computer will make you lose. All I can say is that
you may find yourself losing money on all decks, but some decks
will make lose more than others. You can win if you stay away
from the worst decks ...." (Bechara et al., 1999, p. 5474).
Results
Experimental results showed that subjects preferred the
bad decks (A and B) to the good decks (C and D) (Figure
1). This finding supports the effect of prediction-based
gain-loss frequency and is contrary to that of EV.
Moreover, the average number of times subjects chose bad
decks was higher than that for good decks throughout the
entire experiment (Figure 2). Significant interaction was
found between gain-loss frequency and blocks. However,
no single main effect of blocks was observed. Subjects
gradually adjusted their selection pattern to the chance
level of four choices. The absence of a crossover or lack of
learning curve indicates that gain-loss frequency was
dominant over EV when subjects were choosing decks.
Furthermore, this investigation also analyzes the pattern
of continuing choices after the subject chose AB or CD
(Figure 3). The experimental results showed that subjects
tend to remain on the same type of decks while choosing
A or B. Nevertheless, no significant differences are found
for the continuing choices between the same or the differ-
ent types of decks while they were choosing C or D.
Analysis of the questionnaire results indicated that sub-
jects correctly recalled which decks they chose that had the
highest gains (Figure 4A); but subjects have a chance-level
recollection on which decks they chose that had the high-
est losses (Figure 4B). Conversely, subjects incorrectly
recalled which decks were in use when they won the larg-
est overall amount of money (Figure 4C); but subjects
Table 2: A comparison of gamble structures between the Iowa Gambling Task and Soochow Gambling Task
Iowa Gambling Task Gain-Loss Frequency 
(per 10 cards)
EV (per 10 cards) Choice Prediction Based on 
Gain-Loss Frequency
Choice Prediction Based 
on EV
A (Bad) 5 G 5 L -$250
B (Bad) 9 G 1 L -$250 B
C (Good) 6.25 G 1.25 L 2.5 S +$250 C C
D (Good) 9 G 1 L +$250 D D
Soochow Gambling 
Task *
(per 5 cards) (per 5 cards)
A (Bad) 4 G 1 L -$250 A
B (Bad) 4 G 1 L -$250 B
C (Good) 1 G 4 L +$250 C
D (Good) 1 G 4 L +$250 D
(G: gain, L: loss, S: standoff).
* The deck structure for the Soochow Gambling Task is as follows: A, four consecutive gains of $200 followed by a loss of $1,050; B, four 
consecutive gains of $100 followed by a loss of $650; C, four consecutive losses of $200 followed by a gain of $1,050; D, four consecutive losses of 
$100 followed by a gain of $650. The experiment was using token money denominated in New Taiwan Dollars. For ease of comparison, the amount 
of money was nearly equated to U.S. currency in IGT.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:13 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/13
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have a chance-level to recall which decks were chosen
when they lost the largest overall amount of money (Fig-
ure 4D). Preference patterns of conscious recollection
were consistent with the choice pattern due to the effect of
gain-loss frequency (Figures 4E and 4F).
Discussion
Subjects may apply an implicit strategy to cope with the
uncertain game, therefore they favored high-frequency
gains over high-frequency losses in the experiment. This
"gain-stay, lose-randomize" strategy (Figure 3) [42] has
been observed in human and animal appetitive and
avoidance experiments in which human or animal
encounter reward or punishment [42-48]. These pioneer
behavior studies with the concurrent schedules of rein-
forcement have displayed the frequency effect for choice
pattern [45-49]. Additionally, these concepts have also
been applied to examine the behavioral model of neu-
ropsychological deficit [50,51].
The SGT possessed the variant frequency, magnitude and
delay of reinforcement/punishment depending on each
subject's choice. Most part of these set-ups may be similar
to the consideration of the traditional behavior-analysis
studies [45-49,52], therefore, the gain-loss frequency can
successfully serve as a predictor for choice behavior under
these uncertain situations.
The effect of gain-loss frequency is not an isolated finding
in similar settings. A reexamination of the bad decks (A
and B) in the original IGT [8] indicated that bad deck B (9
gains and 1 loss) was also chosen more frequently than
deck A (5 gains and 5 losses). Other studies obtained sim-
ilar findings but did not explore them further [18-
28,33,34]. Furthermore, some research groups even
showed that normal subjects chose the disadvantageous
deck B more frequently than the advantageous deck C or
D [18-28]. Dunn et al. [14] sampled 38 IGT related studies
to demonstrate that only five studies [18,19,23,25,53] uti-
lized the "four-deck format" to display their findings (i.e.,
the number of card turnings for each deck over a total of
100 trials being shown separately). These studies all dem-
onstrated that deck B was chosen more frequently than
deck A. It is worth noting that four out of five studies
Mean number of cards chosen Figure 1
Mean number of cards chosen. The results of two fac-
tors (repeated measurement) ANOVA (Gain-loss frequen-
cies (gain vs. loss) × Values (± 200 vs. ± 100)) showed a 
significant effect of gain-loss frequency. Subjects selected 
more cards from decks A and B than decks C and D (F (1, 
47) = 26.41, p < .01). The value effect with of the paired t-
test is significant (t (47) = 2.60, p < .05) under high-frequency 
gain (+200 vs. +100), but not significant (t (47) = 0.72, p = 
.48) under high-frequency loss (-200 vs. -100). None of the 
interaction effects are statistically significant (F (1, 47) = 1.88, 
p = .18).
Mean number of cards chosen in blocks Figure 2
Mean number of cards chosen in blocks. 100 card selec-
tion trials were grouped into five blocks, each comprising 20 
trials. The three factor (repeated measurement) ANOVA 
(Gain-loss frequencies (gain vs. loss) × Values (± 200 vs. ± 
100) × Blocks (1 to 5)) indicated a significant main effect for 
gain-loss frequencies (F (1, 47) = 29.44, p < .01) and values (F 
(1, 47) = 9.02, p < .01), but not for blocks (F (1, 47) = 0.00, p 
= 1.00). Furthermore, significant interactions existed 
between gain-loss frequencies and blocks (F (4, 44) = 3.03, p 
< .05) as well as three factors (F (4, 44) = 5.19, p < .01); but 
non-significant interactions existed between gain-loss fre-
quencies and values (F (1, 47) = 1.90, p = .18); values and 
blocks (F (4, 44) = 0.99, p = .43). These results indicate a 
clear preference for the pooled decks A and B ("bad" decks) 
over the pooled decks C and D ("good" decks) from the 
beginning. Subjects seem to be guided by gain-loss frequen-
cies and appear sensitive to the gain-loss structure gradually. 
No cross-over or significant learning curve exists for the 
high-frequency gain (A, B) and high-frequency loss (C, D) 
decks under this condition (100 trials) in the Soochow Gam-
bling Task.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:13 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/13
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[18,19,23,25,53] also demonstrated that deck B was cho-
sen more than deck C or D.
Furthermore, in Peters and Slovic study [54], the modified
IGT study also demonstrated that deck B ($ -250) and D
($ +250) possessed the inversed expected values, but with
nearly equal attraction to subjects. This may imply that
the expected value does not guide decision makers to
approach the beneficial choice in these dynamic games.
On the other hand, in the modified IGT, deck C contained
high-frequency gain (8 out of 10 trials) over deck D (5 out
of 10 trials), but with nearly equal expected value ($ +300
for C vs. $ +250 for D). However, subjects preferred deck
C rather than deck D significantly. The gain-loss frequency
seems to be more reasonable than EV in explaining these
observations. Ahn et al. [55] confirmed the present find-
ing by comparing the decision learning models for IGT
and SGT respectively.
Questionnaire data in this study also indicate a novel phe-
nomenon, namely, the "money account illusion". Sub-
jects ignored the EV dimension and miscounted the
money amount in terms of the strength of frequency, spe-
cifically, frequently receiving gains will leave an overall
impression of large accumulated monetary outcome for a
deck than when gains are infrequently received.
In the IGT, normal subjects shifted their choices to good
decks during the latter part of the game, such that a learn-
ing curve was evident [7-9,36,37,39]. We propose that this
shift is not due to better EV but rather an effect resulting
from more frequent gains than losses. The Somatic Marker
Hypothesis stresses that somatic markers (or peripheral
feedback) predispose normal subjects to behave in
accordance with perceived future consequences over the
long run. This study demonstrated that even subjects with
intact somatic markers cannot behave accordingly to a
search for EV in the SGT. Immediate reinforcement will
override EV in the SGT. Decision makers may have been
guided by immediate gain and, as such, their behavioral
results are consistent with the prediction of gain-loss fre-
quency. Based on the present observation, three possible
interpretations exist for SMH: 1) somatic marker system
may guide decision making behavior via rough-estima-
tion processing (gain-loss frequency), not a precise calcu-
lation (EV: probability × value); 2) somatic marker system
may only contribute to generating subjective feelings
(consciousness), and may not be immediately related to
decision guidance; 3) the operation of the somatic marker
may be involved in gathering the long-term memory, but
may not globally direct choice behavior in situations of
high uncertainty.
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis also posits that somatic
markers guide advantageous behavior in a non-conscious
manner. However, questionnaire results suggest further
that subjects can have a clear knowledge of gain and loss
frequency by the end of the game. This perception eventu-
ally determines their choice patterns. A similar finding
was obtained by Maia and McClelland [34], demonstrat-
ing a possible "conscious" knowledge of EV in the IGT.
In the SGT, normal subjects were stuck with the influence
of gain-loss frequency without shifting to EV throughout
the entire session. If normal subjects cannot resist the
influence of gain-loss frequency, ventromedial prefrontal
patients would have increased vulnerability to the effect of
immediate gains and losses. This prediction seems to be in
line with disinhibition theory that suggests that socially
dysfunctional patients with prefrontal damage have diffi-
culty avoiding a punishment-associated stimulus when
that stimulus was previously associated with a reward
[13,15,16,56]. If this is true, then both normal subjects
and ventromedial prefrontal patients will not be respon-
sive to the long-term dimension.
Supposing this is the case, the facilitative effect of somatic
markers did not induce a learning effect or an advanta-
geous shifting behavior in the long run in the SGT, as con-
sistently proposed by IGT researchers. Careful analysis of
experimental results obtained in this study identified a
subordinate phenomenon in that deck A was chosen
Mean probability of shift and stay in the continuing choice Figure 3
Mean probability of shift and stay in the continuing 
choice. After choosing the (bad) decks A or B, 65% of par-
ticipants remain on these two decks, with only 35% shifting 
to the (good) decks C and D (t (47) = 8.60, p < .01). On the 
other hand, when subjects choose decks C and D, the proba-
bilities of them shifting or staying in their next selection was a 
roughly 50/50 probability of selecting deck A and B versus C 
and D (t (47) = 1.71, p = .09).Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:13 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/13
Page 7 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
Subject memory assessment in the Soochow Gambling Task Figure 4
Subject memory assessment in the Soochow Gambling Task. Forty-eight subjects were required to report their 
behavior and preferences after completion of the game. (4A) Most of the sample (36 subjects) had vivid impressions for high-
frequency gain decks (A+B) (x2 (1) = 12.00, p < .01), (4B) but not high-frequency loss (C+D) (x2 (1) = 0.00, p = 1.00). (4C) 
Additionally, most subjects (31 subjects recognized decks A and B) possessed a clear (but wrong) image for the overall mone-
tary gain (x2 (1) = 4.08, p < .05); (4D) but a blurred image for overall monetary loss (x2 (1) = .08, p = .77). (4E) After completing 
the game, subjects erroneously equated the high-frequency gains as the overall advantage. Thirty one out of forty eight subjects 
indicated the favorable choice to decks A and B rather than C and D (x2 (1) = 4.08, p < .05). (4F) Most unfavorable choice they 
had memorized were decks C and D which possessed the high-frequency loss and positive expected value (x2 (1) = 8.33, p < 
.01).Behavioral and Brain Functions 2008, 4:13 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/4/1/13
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more often than deck B, despite both decks possessing the
same gain-loss frequency. The immediate value of gain
and loss can also alter slightly decision-makers' choices
and is worthy of further exploration.
EV and gain-loss frequency were seriously confounded in
the administration of the IGT. Selection of good decks by
normal subjects cannot only be attributed to the effect of
EV, but must also be explained in terms of gain-loss fre-
quency. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis was further rein-
forced by adopting the principal findings from the IGT
experiment as important supporting data, i.e., somatic
markers predispose normal subjects to search for EV in the
long run. This study explored separately the relative con-
tribution of EV and gain-loss frequency in the SGT, a mod-
ified gambling task. Experimental results indicated that
immediate reinforcement overrides the effect of EV. Crone
et al. [57] also identified a local preference for gain-loss
frequency; however, EV dominated gain-loss frequency in
their modified IGT. In contrast to the predictions based on
Somatic Marker Hypothesis, experimental data in this
study indicate that normal subjects were primarily guided
by the effect of gain-loss frequency rather than EV. This
finding, although differing from the simple explanation
provided by the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, is consistent
with the view of behavioral [1-5] and affective [5,20,58-
62] decision literature, indicating that normal individuals
are often short-sighted when making decisions in stock
market or real life [41,63,64].
Conclusion
A serious confounding effect in IGT was demonstrated by
the "prominent deck B phenomenon". This recently-dis-
covered phenomenon may imply that gain-loss frequency
rather than EV dominates the choice behavior of normal
decision makers under uncertainty. In the original IGT,
these two factors were seriously confounded, and thus this
study proposed a modified task SGT to clarify the relative
contribution of these two factors. The experimental results
indicated that subject selection patterns were mostly pre-
dicted based on gain-loss frequency. Immediate gain may
increase the probability of continuing to stick on the cho-
sen deck, which is consistent with most behavioral-analy-
sis and decision literatures. The observations of this study
indicate that EV is not predictive for choice behaviors as
suggested by IGT. It seems that immediate gain eventually
resulted in a long-term loss. The basic assumption of IGT
is thus no longer plausible to assure the foresighted deci-
sion makers in the Iowa Gambling Task.
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